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The officer walking the beat has numerous tools at her disposal to effectuate a warrantless search. One of the more popular of those tools is the consent search; although no precise
data exist on how often consent searches are conducted, one
study reports that the two most commonly utilized warrantless
searches are consent searches and searches incident to arrest.
In that study, one detective estimated that consent serves as
the basis for 98% of all searches conducted. Police may also
request consent even if they do not need it. At no point must an
officer advise the citizen that she can refuse consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973)
With the foregoing in mind, it would be an understatement
to suggest that officers rely heavily on consent searches. Academics generally view the Supreme Court’s current consent
search doctrine with disdain. Courts and academics alike view
consent searches as difficult to police given the pervasive discretion that officers have in deciding who to ask for consent
to search. As a result of this discretion, allegations of racism
pervade many state police officers’ consent search practices.
If academics, courts, and the public appear uniformly skeptical of current consent search practices—as opposed to the
concept of consent searches—a simple question arises: how
did we get here? To answer that question, step back to 1969
when Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. At that time, many believed Burger’s “law
and order” background foretold overruling the so-called Warren Court trilogy—Gideon (requiring that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants), Mapp (extending the exclusionary
rule to the states), and Miranda (requiring officers to provide
warnings to suspects subject to custodial interrogation). Because that never happened, a handful of important commentators and historians view the Burger Court’s criminal proce-

dure decisions as anticlimactic. That popular view, however,
overlooks the Burger Court’s crowning—but unspoken—antiMiranda achievement: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973). Schneckloth remarkably made clear that warning
citizens of their constitutional rights had no place outside the
context of custodial interrogation—where the vast majority of
society lives.
Why provide warnings to criminal suspects subject to custodial interrogation, but decline to require that citizens be informed of their right to refuse consent? And a related question:
why did the opinion’s author, Justice Stewart, go so far as to assert that administering a right to refuse consent warning would
be “thoroughly impractical”?
This issue of SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW REPORT argues
that Schneckloth should be overruled in light of dramatic changes in politics and our factual understanding of consent searches,
illustrated by three key examples. First, there is no pressure on
the modern Court similar to that present around the fevered postMiranda and post Warren Court—time of Schneckloth. Second,
several states have confirmed that Schneckloth’s underlying
premise—administering Fourth Amendment consent warnings
would be “thoroughly impractical”—is simply wrong. Finally,
post-Miranda literature confirms that Miranda did little to impact confessions; there is analogously good reason to expect that
most people would still give consent to search even if previously
told they were not required to do so.

Schneckloth’s origins

The seeds for the Schneckloth decision were planted long
before the Court actually issued the opinion on May 29, 1973.
How did we get to Schneckloth?

* The full text of this article was published originally at 79
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Setting stage for Schneckloth

In hindsight, the changing nature and increased volume of
police-citizen encounters in the 1960s certainly suggests that it
was no temporal accident the Supreme Court used Schneckloth
to create a more law enforcement-friendly consent doctrine.
The Schneckloth defendant—Robert Clyde Bustamonte—was
arrested in 1967, a time rife with conflicting American opinion
as perhaps best illustrated by the 1968 election of Richard Nixon as President, who earned only 43.5 % of the popular vote.
Apart from the Presidential election, though, the social tensions arising from the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement gave rise to mass demonstrations and protests unlike any
the country had ever seen. For example, nearly 150 American
cities experienced civil unrest in the summer of 1967 alone.
Law enforcement officials were often uncertain as to the appropriate responses and measures of force to use in light of
these unprecedented civil disturbances. In short, the police
were encountering citizens outside of the custodial context in
unprecedented numbers.
The tenuous environment in America during the time of
Bustamonte’s criminal case was arguably heightened by the
wake left behind by the Warren Court. Although Earl Warren
served as Chief Justice from 1953 until 1969, commentators
often refer to the “Warren Court” to mean the time spanning
from 1961, when Justice Arthur Goldberg replaced Justice
Felix Frankfurter, to 1969, when Chief Justice Warren retired.
During that period, the Court issued rulings on several controversial issues, which sparked national public outcry. “Impeach
Earl Warren” signs littered the countryside, and the Court endured criticism from a variety of prominent critics.
Thus, although Bustamonte’s story spanned six years—
from 1967-1973—the outcome in Schneckloth undoubtedly
seems informed by the social impact of the Warren Court’s decisions prior to 1967. When Chief Justice Burger finally filled
Warren’s position on June 23, 1969, he was anxious to distance
his tenure from Warren’s legacy. Of particular note was Chief
Justice Burger’s criticism of the Warren Court’s most famous
decision—Miranda v. Arizona.
Yet, the seeds for Miranda were planted two years earlier
by the Warren Court’s decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964)—a decision Chief Justice Burger likewise
disliked. In 1964, law enforcement agencies nationwide were
debating what limits existed—other than a prohibition against
10
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officers’ use of the third degree—when interrogating a suspect.
But given the Court’s focus on eradicating more violent methods of extracting confessions, police were minimally entitled
to think that the non-violent behavior of law enforcement in
Escobedo was constitutionally permissible.
The Supreme Court decided Escobedo on June 22, 1964.
In doing so, the Court suppressed a defendant’s confession
though the defendant was neither beaten nor threatened; rather,
he had repeatedly requested counsel, but was denied, during an
overnight interrogation. The Court specifically held, pursuant
to the Sixth Amendment, as follows:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have
not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the
Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial.
The Court’s decision in Escobedo served notice: procedure inside the interrogation room was going to change.
The judiciary, however, did not receive Escobedo with uniform approval. Perhaps the biggest Escobedo-related war—
one arguably most predictive of Schneckloth—waged inside
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Inside
that court, Republican-appointee Judge Warren Burger led a
conservative bloc of judges against a separate liberal bloc led
by Democratic-appointee Chief Judge David Bazelon. When
given the opportunity, a Bazelon-led panel generally aligned
itself with the Escobedo majority, e.g., Hutcherson v. U.S., 351
F.2d 748, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1965), whereas Burger-involved decisions applied rationale from the dissent, e.g., Cephus v. U.S.,
352 F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1965). What made the ideological battle particularly interesting was that both judges’ names
were, at varying times, floated in conversations about Supreme
Court vacancies.
Amidst the post-Escobedo chaos, the Supreme Court
dropped the Miranda bombshell on June 13, 1966. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a majority of the Court, “the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”
Public reaction to Miranda reaction was intense. A New York
Times piece characterized the Miranda decision as providing
“immunity from punishment for crime on a wholesale basis.”
Some police believed that the decision forced them to fight
criminals “with two hands tied behind their back.”
Amid the post-Miranda frustration, Judge Burger gave an
address critical of Miranda and the Supreme Court on May
21, 1967, at Ripon College in Ripon, Wisconsin. His remarks
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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were later published and Republican nominee Richard M.
Nixon was captivated when he read them. Nixon even began to integrate Burger’s ideas into his own 1968 presidential
campaign speeches. Burger himself viewed the speech as the
primary reason that Nixon selected him to replace Warren as
Chief Justice.
For Nixon, Miranda was indeed too much to take. Nixon
believed that the courts “[had] gone too far in weakening the
peace forces as against the criminal forces.” He therefore
made “law and order” a central issue in his campaign and
gave speeches decrying the Miranda and Escobedo decisions.
After ultimately winning the election, Nixon began searching for Chief Justice Warren’s replacement in early 1969;
Nixon sought a judge who, among other characteristics, would
“share[] his view that the Court should interpret the Constitution rather than amend it by judicial fiat.” Coincidentally, in
March of that year, the D.C. Circuit reversed a defendant’s
conviction, citing an inability to determine whether the defendant waived his Miranda rights prior to his confession. Frazier
v. U.S., 419 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (1969). Attacking the majority
(and Miranda), Judge Burger issued a bitter dissent, reports of
which emerged in the local press. Nixon noticed, and nominated Burger to be Chief Justice on May 22, 1969; the Senate
confirmed him 18 days later.

Considering the Schneckloth opinion

Once on the Supreme Court, Burger began to reverse the
course set by his predecessor. This pattern most noticeably began during the 1972-73 Term when Schneckloth was argued.
Thus, one thing seemed clear when the Court considered Schneckloth: providing citizens with prophylactic Fourth Amendment consent warnings would likely be an unwelcome suggestion.
Prior to Schneckloth, the law was unclear on the actual
meaning of “consent.” Enter Bustamonte, whose story began
in Mountain View, California, with the burglary of Speedway
Car Wash on the morning of January 19, 1967. Although the
facts are not perfectly clear, it appears Bustamonte was involved—along with Joe Gonzales and Joe Alcala—in that
burglary wherein the trio took a check-writing machine and a
number of blank checks. In the weeks following the burglary,
the trio sought to pass several checks in the name of Speedway
Car Wash using the check-writing machine.
Then, on January 31, 1967, the trio drove to San Jose to
identify individuals who might be willing to use false identification to cash checks. They picked up three additional men
around 11:00 p.m. and sought unsuccessfully throughout the
night to cash the checks at grocery stores, a bar, and a shopping center. As luck would have it, Officer James Rand was
on routine patrol at 2:40 a.m. the next morning and observed
a vehicle with only one functioning headlight. He stopped the
vehicle—a black 1958 Ford four-door sedan—and asked the
driver, Gonzalez, for identification. Of the car’s six occupants,
only Alcala was able to produce identification and, in doing so,
indicated that the car belonged to his brother.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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At that point, Officer Rand asked the occupants to exit the
vehicle. Rand, along with two additional officers, thereafter
asked Alcala if he could search the car, to which Alcala replied,
“Sure, go ahead.” Officer Rand, aided by the other two officers,
searched the Ford and found three checks under the left rear seat.
The checks matched those stolen from Speedway Car Wash.
Bustamonte was arrested and convicted, following a jury trial,
of possession of a completed check with intent to defraud.
Bustamonte’s conviction was subsequently affirmed on direct appeal. Then, following the denial of Bustamonte’s petition
for habeas corpus , the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
denial of Bustamonte’s writ by treating consent to search as
equivalent to waiving a constitutional right, holding that waiver
cannot be presumed from a verbal agreement to consent.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 28, 1972
to “determine whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require the showing thought necessary by the [Ninth Circuit].”
Oral argument occurred on October 10, 1972, before Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Robert Granucci
began for petitioner-Schneckloth by provocatively analogizing “California’s consent rule, . . . to the rule articulated by this
Court prior to Miranda for assessing the voluntariness of confessions, [thereby] mak[ing] knowledge of one’s rights one of the
circumstances to be considered in determining voluntariness.”
Granucci’s focus on Miranda became pervasive. For several pages of oral argument transcript, he either argued substantive points to distinguish Miranda warnings from consent
to search cases, or responded to questions from the Justices
about the role of an officer’s request to search, and the extent
to which that request could be seen as a demand. Regardless
of the setting, the attention to the issue he garnered from the
Court suggested that he had hit a nerve.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
LAW REPORT
Coordinating Editor
John M. Burkoff

PUBLISHER’S STAFF
Darcie Bahr, Attorney Editor
Specialty Composition/Rochester DTP, Electronic Composition
Search and Seizure Law Report (USPS# pending) is issued
monthly except in August, 11 times per year; published and
copyrighted by Thomson Reuters, 610 Opperman Drive, P.O.
Box 64526 St. Paul, MN 55164-0526. Application to mail at Periodical rate is pending at St. Paul, MN. POSTMASTER: Send
address changes to Search and Seizure Law Report, 610 Opperman Drive, P.O. Box 64526 St. Paul, MN 55164-1526.
Subscription: $1,075.50 for eleven issues
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
ISSN 0095-1005

11

February 2013 Volume 40, Number 2
When Stuart Tobisman began his argument on behalf of
Bustamonte, Miranda still lingered on the Justices’ minds.
Yet, the Court now expressed a more precise concern about
what those warnings might look like. At one point, for example, the Court asked whether it would satisfy Tobisman’s
proposed standard “if the policeman had said, in addition to
what he did say, ‘You are not required by law to consent, you
may refuse your consent if you wish; but if you refuse, we
will be obliged to detain you here until we can get a search
warrant’?” Of course, the broader question of whether an individual should be told of her right to refuse consent likewise
persisted throughout Tobisman’s presentation.
Tobisman did his best to allay the Court’s concerns about
Miranda. Tobisman reiterated that specific warnings were not
a talisman to demonstrate an individual’s knowing provision
of consent to search. As a result, he suggested, the solution
was not to require warnings, but rather to revise the California
voluntariness test. In place of the voluntariness test, Tobisman
suggested that State should bear the burden of proving that an
individual actually knew that he could say “no” when asked by
law enforcement for consent. Tobisman concluded his presentation by reiterating that an individual can consent to a search
only if she is aware of her right to say “no.”
A peek inside the Court’s conference on October 11,
1972, the day after oral argument, reflects the Justices’ early
thoughts. Chief Justice Burger initiated the conversation by
stating, “he wouldn’t require [consent] warnings.” Instead,
he would accept “[former State of California Chief Judge]
Traynor’s totality [test which] adds up to reasonable under all
the circumstances.” Justice Brennan thereafter expressed his
disagreement, asserting that the state had to prove consent and
part of the burden of proving consent obligated it to demonstrate knowledge of the right to refuse consent. Justice Stewart
then intervened: “I would agree with [Brennan] that the state
has to prove consent, though not that the burden included
knowledge that he didn’t have to agree to the search.”
Although Justices Marshall and Douglas agreed with Justice Brennan, Justices Blackmun and White did not. Justice
White commented at the conference that the Court “can infer
from the request to search, and the consent thereto, that one
knew that he could refuse.” For his part, Justice Blackmun supported Judge Traynor’s approach, stating “I always read Ker
[an earlier Supreme Court case] as giving the states latitude to
develop their own standards [as] California did here as to its
voluntariness standard.” Justice Powell reduced the substance
of the Court’s discussion, alongside the Justices’ conference
votes, in the following handwritten notes:
Douglas: “Consent: Affirm”
Brennan: “Affirm consent issue. If state relies on consent, state must carry burden of proving that party had
knowledge of his rights.”
Stewart: “Consent. Must be uncoerced but state doesn’t
have to prove knowledge. Thus,”
White: “Consent. Purely a voluntariness issue. State has
no burden to show knowledge.
12
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Marshall: “Affirm Consent. Agree with Brennan on
both issues.”
Blackmun: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with White &
Stewart.”
Powell: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with Byron & Potter.”
Rehnquist: “Reverse Consent. Agrees with Byron &
Potter.”
Burger: “Reverse. Calif. Rule enumerated by Traynor –
views all circumstances + determines voluntariness.”
The Court issued the Schneckloth opinion on May 29, 1973—
more than six years after the initial traffic stop that led to
Bustamonte’s arrest and over seven months after the Court
heard oral argument. The black-letter holding on the consent
issue in Schneckloth is simple: Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is but one factor in determining whether consent
is valid, which is otherwise to be determined from the totality
of the circumstances.
The rationale is more complex. At the outset of the opinion,
Justice Stewart clarified that voluntary consent is a permissible
and constitutional exception to the general requirement that
officers must possess a search warrant prior to undertaking a
search. The question before the Court, however, was how to
define voluntary consent. As an initial matter, the Court found
instructive the same 14th Amendment interrogation cases rejected by Miranda, yet conceded that “[t]hose cases yield no
talismanic definition of ‘voluntariness.’”
After framing “voluntariness” in the historical context of
the Court’s pre-Miranda confession jurisprudence, it simply
extended the 14th Amendment coerced confession voluntariness analysis to Fourth Amendment consent searches. The
Court therefore held that voluntariness is a question of fact
that turns on the totality of the circumstances. The definition
of voluntariness, it added, must accommodate “the legitimate
need for such searches and the equally important requirement
of assuring the absence of coercion.” Nevertheless, it candidly
feared that requiring the prosecution to prove that a defendant knew that he had the right to refuse consent “would, in
practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could
continue to be conducted.” Requiring proof of knowledge, the
majority reasoned, would be difficult for the prosecution to
demonstrate. Additionally, a defendant could seek to exclude
evidence obtained on the basis of consent simply by testifying
that he was unaware that he could refuse to consent.
Apart from requiring proof of knowledge, what about a
warnings regime that would simply inform prospective defendants of their right to refuse consent? The Court answered
as follows: “it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on
the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning.” As to why a Fourth Amendment warnings
system would be “thoroughly impractical,” the majority suggested the following rationale:
Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory
techniques of law enforcement agencies. They normally
occur on the highway, or in a person’s home or office,
and under informal and unstructured conditions. The cir© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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cumstances that prompt the initial request to search may
develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up
leads developed in questioning persons at the scene of a
crime. These situations are a far cry from the structured
atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he
chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights. And,
while surely a closer question, these situations are still
immeasurably far removed from “custodial interrogation” where, in Miranda v. Arizona, we found that the
Constitution required certain now familiar warnings as a
prerequisite to police interrogation.
Considering the Court’s insecurity about Miranda, perhaps the
most important argument still remained: “that Miranda requires
the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensible element of a valid consent.” In rejecting that argument, the
majority reasoned that custodial interrogation is fundamentally
different from the environment of consent searches. Indeed, because most consent searches occur “on a person’s familiar territory” rather than in the stationhouse, Justice Stewart found
no reason to believe that a response to an officer’s request for
consent could be presumptively coerced. The majority therefore
concluded by reiterating its position that no reason existed to
depart from the traditional totality of the circumstances test for
measuring the voluntariness of consent.

After Schneckloth

After the Court issued Schneckloth, scholars generally
agreed that it represented a deviation from how the Warren
Court would have treated consent law if given the opportunity.
That deviation is best understood as a predictable Miranda
backlash; the Burger Court was simply not in the business of
expanding the rights of criminal defendants. Miranda’s fame
remains unmatched despite Burger Court decisions, but its jurisprudential impact has softened. One wonders, then, whether
the Schneckloth majority’s assertions remain valid—was Justice Stewart right to conclude that a Fourth Amendment right
to refuse consent warning would be “thoroughly impractical”?
Moreover, was the Burger Court properly concerned with creating a Fourth Amendment Miranda? In other words, would
fewer people consent if they were first told of their right to
refuse consent?

Schneckloth warnings are not “thoroughly
impractical”

Justice Stewart was wrong to write that requiring Fourth
Amendment warnings would be “thoroughly impractical.”
Moreover, he may have known he was wrong at the time he
wrote the Schneckloth opinion. Regardless, given his personal
hostility toward Miranda and Escobedo, there was little chance
he might be open to extending the rationale of those decisions
to consent searches.
To better understand those latter assertions, consider Justice Stewart’s 23-year-tenure on the Court. Speaking generally, history would come to view Stewart as a pragmatist who

© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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had a “reputation for injecting a cooling influence on the fiery passions that frequently flared in the Court’s conference
room[.]”
More specifically in the realm of criminal procedure, Justice Stewart is perhaps best known for his dedication to the
Sixth Amendment; in particular, his effort to identify precisely
when the Sixth Amendment procedurally attaches and what it
protects. E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
Embodied in that pursuit, however, was his private discontent
with both Escobedo and Miranda—alongside his discontent
with Warren Court opinions more generally.
By the time of Escobedo in 1964, Justice Stewart had already made clear his position that he favored an automatic
right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment at the procedural point when the suspect became the accused. Massiah
v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). Escobedo’s interpreting the
Sixth Amendment to apply to the interrogation room—in other
words, prior to a formal charge—particularly frustrated Justice
Stewart, and prompted him to pen his own passionate Escobedo dissent.
He dissented again two years later in Miranda. In Miranda, however, Stewart declined to pen his own dissent, instead
electing to join opinions authored by Justices Harlan and
White. Justice White’s dissent became more than a historical
footnote when he famously wrote that Miranda would “have
a corrosive effect on the criminal law as an effective device to
prevent crime.”
Immediately after Miranda’s issuance, academics and other
court commentators assessed the accuracy of Justice White’s
prediction. One 1967 study, conducted by Yale Law School,
examined police behavior during interrogations in New Haven, Connecticut in an effort to assess that very statement. After observing well over 100 interrogations over three months, it
found “that warnings had little impact on suspects’ behavior.”
Indeed, the study reported, “[n]o support was found for the
claim that warnings reduce the amount of ‘talking.’”
The Yale study was hardly the only effort, completed prior
to Schneckloth, to assess what impact Miranda would have on
the effectiveness of law enforcement. For example, a study from
Washington D.C. found that nearly 40% of suspects gave incriminating statements to the police post-arrest, compared to
43% who gave statements pre-Miranda. Pittsburgh and Los
Angeles studies similarly saw little change post-Miranda. In Detroit, “the rate of confessions increased . . . after the police instituted a system of warning suspects of their constitutional rights.”
By the time of Schneckloth in the early 1970s, the Miranda storm began to subside. Additional studies conducted in
Denver, Knoxville, Los Angeles, and other cities, all sought
to further the effort to evaluate Miranda’s impact on law enforcement. Like their predecessors, however, each concluded
that Miranda did not significantly diminish the prevalence of
confessions. Thus, while Justice Stewart wrote in Schneckloth
that consent warnings would be “thoroughly impractical,” he
did so while the academic and law enforcement communities’
reached the almost uniform conclusion to the contrary about
Miranda warnings.
13
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Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that several states have
since questioned Schneckloth and its accompanying rationale.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in “sharp departure” from
Schneckloth, requires a “knowledgeable waiver . . . before
consenting to a search.” Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 863
(Miss. 1997). Contrary to Schneckloth’s reasoning, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court noted the possibility for coercion
in knock-and-talk procedures, though it stopped short of requiring warnings. State v. Johnson, 839 A.2d 830, 836 (N.H.
2004). The Minnesota Supreme Court has similarly recognized
problems of pretext and inherent coercion when officers seek
a citizen’s consent during traffic stops. State v. George, 557
N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1997). Finally, an Indiana appellate
court has suggested that the “better practice” would be for
officers to identify themselves and provide warnings during
knock-and-talk encounters, Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492,
497-98 (Ind. App. 2003), rather than hamper police investigations, “such an advisement would minimize needless suppression motions, hearings, and appeals.”
Still others have gone so far as to interpret their own state’s
constitution to require that officers provide right to refuse consent warnings. For example, in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an “essential element” of voluntary consent “is
the knowledge of the right to refuse.” State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d
66, 68 (N.J. 1975). Accordingly, the court adopted a waiver requirement, thereby requiring the government to prove that consenting individuals knew that they could refuse consent.
Two decades later, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
in the “walk and talk” investigative encounter context, consent
cannot be voluntary if obtained through the “material nondisclosure” of failing to advise the individual that the officer is investigating crime and that the individual is free to go at any time.
State v. Trainor, 925 P.2d 818, 828 (Haw. 1996). Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Washington held that warnings of the
right to refuse, to limit, and to withdraw consent were required
when officers sought consent to search a citizen’s home. State v.
Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (Wash. 1998). In doing so, the court
rejected Schneckloth’s impracticality argument on an empirical basis—citing its own cases where officers obtained consent
despite providing warnings and studies reflecting Miranda’s
minimal impact on law enforcement. Most recently, Arkansas
adopted a rule requiring notice of the right to refuse consent in
knock-and-talk searches. State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 722, 732
(Ark. 2004). The totality of the foregoing suggests that Justice
Stewart wrote tongue-in-cheek that right to refuse consent warnings would be “thoroughly impractical.”

Historical circumstances suggest modern
need for Schneckloth warnings

Consistent with conclusions reached by the early Mirandaimpact literature in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s,
Miranda scholarship in the 1980s offered more of the same:
law enforcement had learned to live with Miranda, and most
officers believed that Miranda posed no “serious” law enforcement problems. Importantly, however, the 1980s seemingly
saw a resurgence of academic scholarship reevaluating Miranda. One individual, Professor Joseph Grano, was particu-
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larly—and pervasively—critical of Miranda, often arguing in
favor of creating an uneven playing field when interacting with
potentially guilty suspects.
Academic scholarship in the 1990s expanded upon Professor Grano’s Miranda-based criticisms by venturing into the
empirical realm in an effort to demonstrate Miranda’s harmfulness. Professor Paul Cassell led a vocal charge asserting,
in a variety of articles, that prior Miranda impact studies had
understated the decision’s harmful impact on confessions.
Other empirical literature sought to move past the early postMiranda studies; indeed, Professor Richard Leo asserted in his
mid-1990s study of multiple police departments in California
that whether Miranda significantly impacted law enforcement
had become a “sterile issue.”
Whatever conclusion should be drawn from the Miranda
impact literature about its precise impact on law enforcement,
one thing seems clear: informing citizens of their rights does
not, as Justice White feared in his Miranda dissent, significantly impair law enforcement. People are indeed still confessing. But why? An early post-Miranda study concluded that,
assuming suspects understood their rights, they nonetheless
confessed for one of several reasons: (1) they did not trust a
lawyer offered by the police; (2) they wanted to talk only to
people “who would let me know what [they were] up against;”
(3) preoccupation with other concerns; (4) a concern for being
hit or beaten by the police; (5) a desire to convince the police
of their innocence; (6) a hope for leniency; or (7) an overarching compulsion to speak. Given that the intensity of the interrogation room environment persisted post-Miranda, that factor alone contributed most significantly to suspects’ continued
willingness to confess.
Similar logic pervades during the police-citizen consent
search encounter. The limited empirical research available to
explain why people consent to search—despite some being
warned of their right to refuse consent—reveals that citizens are
simply afraid. Stated more precisely, citizens’ fear of an officer’s
reprisal is the primary reason why people consent to search.
Given the apparent overlap between the circumstances
prevalent in Fourth and Fifth Amendment police-citizen encounters, there seems good reason to apply Miranda-related
empirical research to consent searches—despite what the
Schneckloth Court believed. And, assuming that warnings do
not significantly impair law enforcement, then Justice Stewart must be wrong; it would not be “thoroughly impractical”
to require that officers provide citizens with a consent search
Fourth Amendment warning. It therefore seems difficult not
to discard the rationale underlying Schneckloth in favor of
adopting one of the fundamental propositions rejected by the
Schneckloth majority: “proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent [as] a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a
‘voluntary’ consent.”
Equally if not more important than the implications of Miranda-related empirical research on consent searches is the recent absence of a President preoccupied with a single Supreme
Court decision along with justices appointed to overrule that
decision. In contrast, by the time Bustamonte’s case emerged
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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before the Supreme Court, Nixon was confident that his four
appointees were well on their way to his stated mission: overrule Miranda. Miranda was never overruled, but the Burger
Court did something equally remarkable: it told citizens that
they had no right to be informed of their constitutional rights
during a police encounter involving a consent search.
Yet, the Schneckloth decision received a dearth of media
attention. Although the New York Times reported the issuance
of the Schneckloth opinion on the front page of its May 30,
1973, newspaper, that day’s paper did not feature an accompanying editorial about Schneckloth’s implications. The substantive story did, however, characterize the decision as part of a
“continuing trend on the Court toward majorities that favor the
protection of society as a whole as against the rights of the accused” and noted that “[a]ppointees of President Nixon formed
the core of both majorities.” Id. The Schneckloth opinion’s farreaching ramifications seemingly came and went in 1973 without significant notice by the academic community either.
The initial absence of media and academic attention paid
to Schneckloth belies its impact on citizens’ day-to-day lives.
Given that so few citizens commit a crime, a correspondingly
insignificant number of those citizens will face off against an
officer during an interrogation; after all, Miranda only applies
to custodial interrogation. Yet, outside the interrogation room,
43.5 million (of 288.4 million) persons in 2005 had at least one
police contact; 56% of those contacts arose in a traffic-related
context. Given the popularity of consent searches amongst officers, the traffic stop carries with it the real potential that officers will ask citizens for consent to search their cars. Roadside
questioning, after all, is not custodial interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda. Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11
(1988). The Burger Court therefore pulled off—under the radar, mind you—telling America that officers may constitutionally seek your consent to search without informing you of your
rights during any and every police-citizen encounter. Putting
aside the irony, informing criminal suspects of their rights, but
not ordinary citizens is, in a word, remarkable.
The Burger Court’s doing so was the predictable result of
pushing back against the Warren Court legacy, and a corresponding effort to restore a perceived absence of “law and order.” The Burger Court was indeed simply doing what Nixon
foresaw even before he appointed Chief Justice Burger. Thus,
in hindsight, the composition of the Schneckloth majority and
its preoccupation with Miranda is unsurprising. Chief Justice
Burger’s criticism of Miranda prior to his joining the Court,
alongside his thematic criticism of the Warren Court, suggests
that his vote to join Justice Stewart’s opinion was preordained.
So too perhaps were the other Justices’ votes; when, for example, Justice Rehnquist joined the Court in 1971, he did so “with
a desire to counteract some ‘excesses’ of the liberal activist
Warren Court.” And, as Assistant Attorney General, Rehnquist
gave a speech at the University of Arizona during which he
suggested “that the Court should overrule decisions like Miranda, without feeling bound by ‘stare decisis.’” One commentator, reflecting on Rehnquist’s voting record, confirmed
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a “consistency between the views he indicated before his appointment to the Court and his record on the Court.”
Votes from Justices Powell and Blackmun, as Nixon appointees and vocal Miranda critics, were likewise foreseeable.
So too was the vote cast by Justice White, author of a vigorous Miranda dissent in which he claimed that Miranda would
“measurably weaken” the criminal law because “[i]n some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a
rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment
which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases
him.” Justice Stewart, the Schneckloth opinion’s author, although not a Nixon appointee, was likewise predictable; he often helped to form majorities on the Court that were consistent
with votes by the Nixon appointees.
The takeaway point, therefore, is hopefully clear: all of the
majority Justices’ positions in Schneckloth were more than
foreseeable. Indeed, the 1972-1973 Term was the first full Term
for all of President Nixon’s appointees—Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Remarkably,
during that term, the Nixon-appointed justices agreed in more
than 100 of all the 177 cases heard, and they were even more
closely aligned in criminal procedure cases. As a result, the
Burger Court for the first time that Term effectuated a gradual
but pronounced shift away from Warren Court values in the
context of criminal defendants’ rights. Its shift was unsurprising; by the time of Schneckloth, only two Justices from the
five-justice Miranda majority remained on the Court.
But similar circumstances do not persist today. Although
similarity between then and now unquestionably exists, only
the time period around Bustamonte’s case can claim ownership
over Miranda—and the Supreme Court’s preoccupation with it.
Commentators, politicians, and citizens have since seen no Supreme Court criminal procedure case that is similar to Miranda
in terms of its fame and impact. Congress does not now seek to
limit the Court’s jurisdiction or its pay. Senators do not spend
time on the senate floor seeking to convince colleagues that legislation is required to overrule the Court’s criminal procedure
decisions. Outside of Congress, civil unrest does not litter our
streets. Politicians do not build campaigns around replacing the
Court’s Justices. Signs do not litter the country’s landscape calling for the impeachment of Chief Justice Roberts.
The Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged that circumstances have changed since Miranda. In 2000, the Court in
Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed the constitutionality of Miranda
and noted that “Miranda has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture.” 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). Amidst
other rulings that seemingly narrow the breadth and scope
of Miranda’s applicability—and Dickerson’s relevance—the
Court has also recently issued a pair of rulings that arguably
expand Miranda’s core holding requiring warnings. Compare
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (narrowing the applicability of the right to remain silent by requiring
that a suspect unambiguously invoke the right), with Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203-04 (2010) (holding that suspects
have a right to have their lawyer present during police ques15
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tioning, and the police are required to inform suspects of that
right as part of their Miranda warnings).
The totality of the foregoing clearly reflects that reason no
longer exists to uphold Schneckloth as the law on consent. In its
place, commentators have often suggested that police officers
be required to advise a suspect of her right to withhold consent
prior to requesting permission to search. Any such warning
should likely also include a caution to suspects of their right to
temporally or spatially limit their grant of consent. That warning scheme makes particular sense given Justice Marshall’s
observation in his Schneckloth dissent that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for years routinely informed subjects of the
right to refuse consent—a practice that has persisted well beyond the timing of Schneckloth.
Detractors of this thesis may rightly suggest that the Court
would be loath to overrule Schneckloth, particularly given its
current composition. Critics may likewise suggest that a more
modern Supreme Court already declined the opportunity to
overrule Schneckloth in 1996 when it held in Ohio v. Robinette
that officers need not inform lawfully seized citizens that they
are free to go prior to requesting consent to search. 519 U.S.
33, 39-40 (1996).
As to point one, there is but one response: fair enough. After all, many thought at the time of Dickerson that the Court
should seize the opportunity to overrule Miranda—which it
declined—particularly with Rehnquist serving as Chief Justice.
But the Fifth Amendment requires Miranda warnings and states
are not free to reject them. In contrast, states are free to reject
Schneckloth and require Fourth Amendment consent warnings.
And, as demonstrated above, a significant handful of states have
rejected Schneckloth or, at a minimum, questioned its reasoning. Moreover, as the Miranda Court recognized (but the Schneckloth Court ignored), there is something inherently important
about the awareness of rights and ensuring that awareness via
warnings is a way to protect those rights. Logic therefore dictates that law enforcement practice adapt to those protections.
Thus, although it remains highly unlikely that the Court would
overrule Schneckloth, it has, at least historically, acknowledged
the climate of state approaches to certain doctrines, alongside a
willingness to evaluate poorly reasoned opinions.
As to point two, the problem with suggesting that Robinette was the appropriate vehicle for overruling Schneckloth,
however, resides again with timing. By the time of Robinette’s
issuance, the Rehnquist Court was well into furthering its predecessor Court’s pattern of narrowing precedents favorable
to the accused, and just as important, Chief Justice Rehnquist
authored the majority opinion in Robinette. In his opinion,
Rehnquist emphasized what he found persuasive back in
1973—Justice Stewart’s thoughts about consent:
And just as it “would be thoroughly impractical to
impose on the normal consent search the detailed re-
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quirements of an effective warning,” so too would it be
unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search
may be deemed voluntary.
Given that lingering alliance between Schneckloth majority
members Rehnquist and Stewart, using Robinette as a vehicle
for overruling Scheckloth seems unlikely indeed.
A final question perhaps remains amongst doubters of this
thesis: why bother with requiring officers to provide right to refuse consent warnings if suspects do not invoke their Miranda
rights? First, warnings would help dissipate the coercive environment of a police-citizen encounter and help to decrease the
possibility of pretext. Moreover, the idea that coercion exists in
the ordinary police-citizen encounter suggests the applicability
of concerns voiced by the Miranda Court about police coercion in the interrogation room. Finally, from the standpoint of
the criminal justice system’s aesthetic credibility, Justice Goldberg long ago offered these words in Escobedo:
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if
it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the
citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have
to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a
lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these
rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.
His words are persuasive now as they were then.

Conclusion

In 1973, the Supreme Court held that providing a right to
refuse consent warning to citizens would be “thoroughly impractical.” At that time, the holding perhaps made sense. The
political, social, and judicial circumstances were truly unique;
the Burger Court—wary of creating another Miranda—was in
no mood to provide additional prophylactic warnings. Nixon
all but made sure of the Court’s mood by packing the Court
with four anti-Miranda justices of his choosing.
But, today, similar circumstances do not persist. Miranda
has not been overruled; rather, it has been affirmed. Along
the way, researchers have exhaustively confirmed that Miranda has not significantly impaired law enforcement. Citizens
therefore remain entitled to know of their Fifth Amendment
rights anytime they are in police custody and subject to interrogation. Logic suggests that citizens should likewise be told
of their Fourth Amendment rights during the far more likely
chance that they are involved in an encounter with the police.
The Constitution affords citizens the right to refuse an officer’s
request to search their person or property; common sense dictates that officers inform them of that right.
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